IN THE summer of 1973, Prime Minister Edward Heath’s Tory government began preparations to impose its Phase III pay freeze.
Heath was very aware that this would lead to a confrontation with the trade unions, in particular the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). So he attempted to gain an understanding of the forces at work within the trade unions.

Alongside this, the Tory government set in motion plans to mobilise the police nationally should striking miners use flying pickets, as they had in 1972.

On August 21, 1973, Heath sent ‘Personal Minute No.M84/73’ to Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend. He wrote: ‘Following upon our discussion at lunch last Friday about the present attempts to create a Watergate atmosphere in this country, I would like to have a word with you when we next meet about our industrial intelligence and the methods used by those responsible for it.’ [PREM 15/2130. 1974-1975 Industrial Relations. The National Archive.]

Trend replied to Heath on September 21. He wrote: ‘I have been reasonably reassured by a discussion which Sir John Hunt and I had with Mr Waddell and Mr Hanley – at least to the extent of being satisfied that the number of warrants in operation for purposes of industrial intelligence, is relatively small (I can give you particulars, if you wish); that these warrants are, of course, subject to specific Ministerial approval in each case; that they are justified – in accordance with the Security Service’s “Charter” – by reference to a genuinely subversive risk (as distinct from a risk of purely industrial trouble); and that the operations involved are carried out with very great care.

‘I suspect, therefore, that we can probably let matters remain as they are without running into too much danger. But, because the period ahead is liable to become increasingly sensitive, both industrially and politically, and any exposure of our activities would be proportionately damaging, you may feel that, if you have time, you should yourself discuss the matter with the Home Secretary, Sir John Hunt and Mr Hanley and satisfy yourself that the activities which are in hand and are projected are neither too few for usefulness, nor too many for safety.’

Hunt was from the Cabinet Secretariat and the others from the Home Office and Security Service.
Since Security Service documents are not normally released until after 50 years, we are given no material concerning their activities, to which Trend refers.

Another newly-released document from the Home Office does contain a report from the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch. [HO322/409]

Addressed to the Home Office and headed Metropolitan Police Special Branch, it was sent on February 20, 1974. It stated:

‘1. The following information has been received from a reliable source: ‘As from today National Union of Mineworkers pickets will allow the supply of oil through picket lines to power stations.

‘2. This decision was reached following a plea from Jack Jones of Transport and General Workers Union to the National Union of Mineworkers after threats of legal action were made against the unions by the Central Electricity Generating Board.
‘D Buchanan, Sergeant’

One product of Heath’s minute to Trend appears to be the production of a series of bulletins entitled ‘Subversive Influences in Industry: A digest compiled from published sources’ (SII).

The purpose of these reports was to keep the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and key departments like the Department of Employment, Energy and the Home Office, informed of the activities of militants in the trade unions.

There were six such digests, the first dated January 1-19, 1974 and the last on February 25, 1974. They contained excerpts from both the capitalist press and socialist publications. There were also transcripts from radio broadcasts in the Soviet Union, eastern Europe and China.

The first one dealt with ‘A Industrial Strategy’, dealing with the Communist Party, International Socialists, the Workers Revolutionary Party and the International Marxist Group. It gave a synopsis of the views of the Communist Party Industrial Organiser Bert Ramelson in a pamphlet ‘Smash Phase III’, published on January 8, 1974.

Quoting from Workers Press, January 5, 1974 it noted: ‘A statement issued on January 4, by the political committee of the Workers Revolutionary Party urged all trade unionists to: ‘ “Occupy all factories threatened with closure and redundancies. Build a triple alliance of miners, railmen and engineers against Phase III and the Tory government. Abolish the anti-union laws. . . Build Councils of Action on a local, regional and national basis to organise the fight against the Tory government. Join the Workers Revolutionary Party.’

This digest considered the situation in other unions other than the NUM, ASLEF, UCATT, TGWU. AUEW and EETPU. Using information from The Economist magazine, the digest highlighted the fact that there were 10 CP members on the 36-strong TGWU Executive, seven in the leadership of ASTMS and six on the Executive of the NUM.

SII Number 3, February 4, 1974 concentrated on the statements of Mick McGahey, a leading CP member who was Vice-President of the NUM. It also had a section, ‘Arthur Scargill’s Activities’. It noted that Scargill was President of the Yorkshire Area of the NUM and on the EC. It reported Scargill saying: ‘ “ When the state takes unified action against a single trade union, then the trade union movement has no alternative but to take unified action in response. . .” ’ (Workers Press, 28.1.74)

The third item of concern in this digest was the issue of ‘Polish Coal Imports’. It was realised that the British CP had a dual position, that the Polish government had to honour contracts, but wanted Polish workers to block coal exports to Britain.

Heath obviously used the material in the digest for his speech to the House of Commons witch-hunting militants in the trade unions.
The draft of this speech is in the material released by The National Archive.

In his speech Heath said: ‘To this end the [Communist] Party is determined to mobilise what influence it can in the trade union movement to defeat the counter-inflation policy and bring about the fall of the Government. These aims, which are shared by the Trotskyist groups, have been repeatedly published in the Trotskyist and Communist press.’

There was a discussion in the Cabinet on January 24, 1974 about the political relationship of forces in the NUM leadership. [CAB128/53/28]

Minutes reveal: ‘The Secretary of State for Employment [William Whitelaw] said that [NUM President] Mr Gormley, for reasons that were difficult to understand, had decided to recommend a strike ballot and Mr Daly, the General Secretary and Mr McGahey, the Vice-President, had naturally agreed. No doubt the militants in the NUM Executive would take the same line and moderates would not oppose them: the moderates might indeed take the view that the more extreme the proposition on the ballot sheet the better chance of its rejection.’

Alongside gathering intelligence on trade unionists and waging a propaganda campaign against those seeking action against Phase III, the Heath government made preparations for dealing with ‘flying pickets’.

In the early part of 1973 there were exchanges between lawyers at the Home Office and the Transport Branch of the Department of the Environment. They were discussing the Draft Transport of Passengers by Road (Restriction) Order and how this might be used to stop miners’ pickets hiring coaches. [HO322/409]

When it seemed likely that the miners would strike, the government considered whether it could get coach companies to report when they were hired by strikers, or block the hire of coaches.

On January 1, 1974 Robert Armstrong of the Cabinet Office wrote to Syd Norris of the Home Office saying that Heath had asked whether there could be ‘control of lettings during the period of the strike. The Prime Minister assumes that necessary process could be taken under Emergency Regulations.’

Norris replied to Armstrong: ‘We have now considered it again in conjunction with the DoE and on balance the Home Secretary has reached the view that the idea cannot be usefully pursued, as was indeed the conclusion last year.’

The Home Office did, however, convene a meeting on February 1, 1974 to organise the national response of the police to a miners’ strike and picketing. Apart from Home Office officials, the meeting was attended by the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, two other Inspectors of Constabulary and 13 Chief Constables, including the head of the Metropolitan Police.

A National Reporting Centre (NRC) was set up at F1 Division, the Home Office, Horseferry Road. Reports were drawn up and circulated from there daily between February 1, and this ceased on March 6.

The report from the NRC at noon on February 10, 1974, informed government officials and ministers that there were pickets at ‘32 collieries, two power stations and two coke ovens’.

Despite the intelligence gathering, black propaganda against ‘militants’ and the mobilisation of the police, Heath was forced into calling a general election.

The election on February 28, 1974 resulted in a defeat for the Tory government and Labour taking office. Margaret Thatcher was a member of Heath’s Cabinet in 1974 and learned from his failure to defeat the miners. When she became Prime Minister in 1979 she was determined to smash the organised strength of the trade unions.

• To be continued